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Rwanda is striving to promote export expansion, this thesis show why Korea was chosen, 
similarities of the two countries, analyses Korea’s situation before and all the process to export 
expansion strategies adopted and implemented, measures used, also shows Rwanda’s initial start 
to export, what Rwanda is doing to promote export, what lesson to draw from Korea’s 
experience of success in export expansion and then recommends. The study reveals that, the key 
strategy to the Korea’s success in export promotion was the state’s intervention in policy 
formulating, resource allocation, incentives and subsidy’s allocation, human resource and 
education, market diversification, firms allocated in exporting and importing sectors with their 
different incentives at the start of the year and celebrate at the end of the year for achieving the 
set targets and giving rewards to the best performers. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the past two decades, Rwanda’s economy has been the quickest flourishing economy in the 
Sub Saharan Africa at GDP growth of 8% (World Bank 2015 a). Later, the economic growth 
declined due to poor performance in Agriculture (Smith 2012). Regardless of the former 
country’s economic growth, however, development in export promotion particularly in 
manufacturing sector and in general industrial sector have remained weak.  Generally, one 
crucial indicator of country’s economic development is its stand in industrialization (UK essays 
trusted by students since 2003). Also (Rodriguez Mwalenga, Sept, 2012) Industrialization is 
important pillar of economy’s development, particularly in developing countries, it speeds-up 
economic growth, decreases dependence in foreign aid, creates employment opportunities, 
generates consumer goods to other sectors in need of them, adds up value to primary goods to 
mention a few (Brisbane, 1980).  The above author continues to discuss how in the year 1945 
after second world war up to 1970s, countries that adopted Import Substitution Strategy to 
produce consumer goods for luxuries and domestic market with high tariffs. However, some 
countries transitioned to export-oriented strategy and succeeded as will be elaborated in the 
details while others which didn’t change to Export-oriented failed. Thus Export Substitution 
Strategy proved to be important pillar of economy’s development 
(https://www.investopedia.com).  
It is from this outlook; this thesis aims to examine which strategies can Rwanda learn from 
Korea’s experience of 1960s to 1970s to promote export promotion in manufacturing industry. 
Then one can ask, why South Korea? 
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South Korea is one of the four Asian Tigers that is recognized of being the fast- growing 
economies in the second half of the 20th century. The four Asian Tigers are Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
South Korea and Singapore. Among the four countries, the author chose south Korea as 
comparative case of Rwanda in this thesis due to some similarities two countries share. South 
Korea is a country that has flourishingly changed into absolute industrialized economy but when 
historically, it was like other developing countries among which Rwanda is included hence this 
thesis. 
More to this, in his remarks of 12th National leadership retreat in 2015, H.E the president of 
Republic of Rwanda Paul Kagame addressing to the leaders said “compare yourself with the 
best, not the worst. If you want to compare, compare with those who have achieved what 
we are struggling to achieve”. 
 It is in regard to the above remarks this research will compare South Korea’s export promotion 
process and that of Rwanda so as to obtain some appropriate lessons from South Korea’s 
experience. In this introductory chapter one, the following parts will come as follows; Research 
questions, research objectives, significance of the study and thesis structure.  
1.1 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
In light of these research questions, this research’s goal is to achieve the following objectives. 
First and foremost, this research attempts to examine the strategies formulated by Rwanda 
government to promote export expansion and develop industrial sector to increase domestic 
production and export promotion in relation to those implemented by South Korea as a 
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comparative case study.  In specific, it seeks to examine strategies formulated to promote export 
promotion and industrial sector to increase domestic production and to promote exports. 
The second objective of this thesis is to examine the roles of government in formulating and 
implementing strategies in the case of South Korea as a comparative case study of this thesis. 
The third objective and the last one of this thesis will attempt to draw appropriate strategy 
lessons to promote exports and industrial sectoral development through construction of Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) to increase domestic production and promote exports in Rwanda and to 
provide potential policy recommendations in future. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Rwanda is striving to promote export expansion through developing industrial sector to increase 
domestic consumption and promote export promotion to foster future growth of Rwanda 
economy. In line with this strategic move, this thesis attempts to answer the questions as follows; 
a. What are the rationale of Rwanda to develop strategies to promote export promotion and 
increase domestic production? 
b. What lesson can Rwanda learn from South Korea’s successful strategies to develop 
industrial sector to increase domestic production and promote export? 




1.3  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
This study will play a part to the innovation of export promotion policies and strategies to 
increase domestic production and export promotion. 
 Second, the comparative analysis of Korea’s successful experiences provides a new insight on 
policy and strategy formulation for developing countries that have a target of becoming middle-
income countries among them is Rwanda. 
 Third, this thesis will help policy makers to adopt effective policies and strategies formulation to 
promote not only export promotion expansion, but other sectors of development of the country. 
The outcomes of this study will provide useful contribution in the formulation of other 
development plans and policies.  
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This Research is composed of seven chapters. 
The first chapter comprises of Introduction, Research questions, Research objectives, 
significance of the study, thesis structure, similarities of two countries, Rwanda’s economic 
development, Rwanda’s industrial sector, statement of the problem, Research methodology and 
lastly, the Scope and limitations of the study. 
The second chapter is divided into ten parts, the first part deals with Literature Review, 
definition of key terms, empirical evidence, import substitution strategy, foundational and 
historical perspectives of export strategy, advantages of export strategy, Analytical concept of 
Developmental state in East Asia (Four Asia Tigers), the role of Developmental state, 
developmental state in Latin America and Developmental state in Africa. Chapter three is 
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composed of ten parts, the first part outlooks Korea’s import substitution policy, introduction, 
Kickoff export promotion strategy, export incentives in 1950s-1960s, Government support to 
SMEs, Korea’s import policy, KOTRA and other institutions, Musan special economic Zones, 
introduction, Musan objectives, Link of SEZs performance with domestic economy, 
contributions of SEZs and Korea’s success in export.  Chapter four is divided into eleven parts, 
the first part discusses   Rwanda’s export sector, introduction, export composition, Rationale to 
promote exports, industrial sector, establishment of Rwanda development board, establishment 
of Kigali special economic zones (SEZs), inception of domestic market recapturing strategy, 
made in Rwanda campaign, establishment of export growth fund, EGF objectives, EGF targeted 
sector. Chapter five, makes a comparative analysis of import-export strategy of two countries of 
Korea and Rwanda. Chapter six is divided into two eight parts, the first part makes introduction 
of the chapter, state intervention, import-export transition, export incentives, Human resource 
and education, selective products, market diversification and Agency responsible for export 
promotion. The seventh chapter which is the last of this thesis, is divided into three parts, the first 
one is the summary of the thesis, followed by conclusion and lastly, recommendations. 
1.5 SIMILARITIES OF TWO COUNTRIES 
To start with political factor, South Korea’s experience is potentially appropriate to a wide 
developing countries in general, but in particular to Rwanda due to some shared history termed 
as initial conditions. South Korea was historically colonized which is same to Rwanda, South 
Korea had just emerged from its civil wars with North Korea in which most of the population 
was killed and displaced. Similarly, to Rwanda’s case of 1994 genocide in which almost one 
million people lost lives, economy destroyed and political system. South Korea is recognized as 
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a country which spoke out against corruption during its time of development up to presently. 
Likewise, to Rwanda’s case, the leadership of His excellency president Kagame is against 
corruption and other issues related to it, thus Rwanda comes on the fourth position in Sub 
Saharan Africa and 48 out of 180 countries and territories in the world (Corruption perceptions 
index 2017). Last on Leadership, South Korea’s president was popular to business people and all 
citizens, he invited business people to invest their money in projects that are beneficial to the 
state, he also valued the significance of five-year Economic Development Plan and initiation of 
Saemaul Undong (New village movement) whose objective was to overcome poverty and 
achieve better Korean communities (Saemaul Undong concept). Likewise, to Rwanda 
government do recognize that, to attain development, private sector has to play a role, as the 
reason Rwanda government has formulated private sector development strategy 2013-2018 
(PSDS) whose objectives are to help Rwanda achieve growth, create jobs, exports and 
investment. The government has established a government program Vision 2020 as policy 
orientation whose major objective is to transform the country from Agricultural based to middle 
income country, free from poverty and people have health life, EDPRS 1 &II, as functional and 
policy orientation to vision 2020. (Vision 2020, EDPRS I & ii) 
In economic factor, South Korea was aid dependence, infant mortality was high, life expectancy 
was 57  years and 60 percent of the population lived below poverty line, had trade deficit, 
geographically land was mountainous not easy for cropping, un employment,  made land reform 
to ease industrialization, all this characterized Korean economy  but in short time, Korea has 
transitioned from economic under development to developed nation thus this move given name 
of “The Korean miracle” (Irma Adelman Nov 16, 2007). Likewise, all the economic challenges 
mentioned above are the same like Rwanda, where life expectancy in Rwanda is on 62, under 
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poverty line on 30%, infant mortality 30, but still under implementation of different policies to 
reach a better standard, land was reformed in Rwanda (World Bank report 2015, World Bank 
country overview, land law No 08/2005 of 14/07/2005). 
 
South Korea and Rwanda shares common geography and history, where the two countries are  
mountainous with little natural resources hence a need to adjust in innovation and technology. In 
both countries people have one mother language. However, the two countries do have some 
dissimilarities in size, population and geographical location. Firstly, comparing the size of two 
countries, South Korea is 99.720 square km, while Rwanda is 26.338 square km.  In brief, South 
Korea is about four times bigger than Rwanda. (www.mylifeelsewhere.com/country-size-
comparison/south-korea/rwanda). 
Secondly, as far as population is concerned, in 1960s South Korea’s population was 25 million 
people (world population review.com/countries/south. Korea). 
While the current population of Rwanda is 12.552.401 million people, that is, two times of South 
Korean population (https://tradingeconomics.com). 
 Last but not the least is geographical location of each country, South Korea is located in East 
Asia, surrounded by three seas, the yellow sea to the west, the East of China to the South and the 
North Korea to the North, as we can see it is within the sea. While Rwanda is a land locked 
country located in central Eastern Africa, bordered by the Democratic Republic of Congo to the 




After realizing the similarities between South Korea and Rwanda, the author found the two 
countries suitable to be compared   in comparative analysis of this thesis. 
1.6 Rwanda’s economic development  
Rwanda is a small country in size and in population in Sub Saharan Africa, also its economic 
growth is comparably lower than its members in EAC. The country is rebuilding itself from 
tragedies that it faced in 1994 genocide. It also lacks access to ports which affects its 
international trade. Further to this, the country is under-endowed with little natural resources, it 
also lacks infrastructures like electricity and transportation which still affects its trade, which in 
turn are barriers to private sector to engage in business. Despite of all challenges above, the 
leadership shows strong commitment to pursue economic development. 
 
Figure 1.1 Share of economic sectors in the gross domestic product (GDP) from 2007 to 2017 
Source: The statistics portal (https://www.Statista.com) 
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 According to the graph, the share of economic sectors in the gross domestic product (GDP) in 
Rwanda from 2007 to 2017, the share of Agriculture in Rwanda was 30.96%, industry had 15.77% 
and service sector contributed 46.38%. The industrial sector comes behind other sectors of the 
economy. From the above graph, the observation shows that industry sector has a gap which 
need to be brimmed. Though, the percentage of industry is low, in the year 2001 to 2012, the real 
GDP growth has been increasing annually at around 8%, however, in the following years the 
growth rate decreased at 7% (World Bank 12 a).  The government established development 
program strategy in 2000 which has six objective pillars, the key one is to transform the country 
from low income country to a middle income by 2020 (Government of Rwanda 2000). In order 
for the government to obtain its long-term development goals, it has elaborated a medium term 
strategy for five years called the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(EDPRS I). Presently, the country is under implementation of EDPRS II which outlines 
strategies of 2013 to 2018. Among all the strategies that it consists the highest priority is to speed 
up the growth and poverty reduction in five dimensions which are; economic transformation, 
rural development, productivity and youth employment and lastly is governance and 
accountability. Specifically, the main goal of EDPRS is to make GDP grow so as to reach at 
1000$, reduce poverty rate below 30% and to reduce extreme poverty rate under 9% 
(Government of Rwanda 2013). 
1.7 RWANDA’S INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
Rwanda industrial sector is composed of mining and quarrying, agro-processing, other 
manufacturing, utilities and construction. Among all, construction contributes 7.1%, agro- 
processing come as the second with 3.5%, followed by mining and quarrying with 1.8% second 
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to the last is other manufacturing with 1.4% and the last one is utilities with 0.6%. For more 
details, see the table below. 
 
Figure 1.2 Industrial components totals to 14.4% from 1999-2014 
From the graph, the components of Industrial sector are not strong enough to support the 




Figure 1.3 Exports share of GDP  from 2003-2014 
Source: Ministry of Trade and industry, 2015 
From the figure 1.3, exports share increased due to increase in minerals that exported, like in 
2010, the exports were 5.2% and it improved in 2014, where exports increased to 9.2%. The 
improvement was due to the increase of minerals in the following years of 2013 and 2014. 
Rwanda exports are extremely reliant on traditional basic products like coffee, tea, tantalum, 
tungsten, wolfram and pyrethrum. In the year 2013, minerals were the leading exports in Rwanda 
but it shortly fell when mineral prices were hit. In the year 2014 and 2015, export voucher from 
minerals lessened, the government become anxious about how to obtain exchange rate. As a 
response, the Rwanda government pledged to higher extra rate flexibility, decreasing imports and 
preventing fiscal policies (IMF 2016). Apart from the fall of mineral’s prices, the remaining 
products cannot sustain economy.  industrial base is very small while technological capacity 




Figure 1.4 Recent trends for trade case in Rwanda 
Source: Author’s alteration 
1.8 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The current problem related to export is that Rwanda exports relies on traditional commodities 
whose prices are not stable and spends more on imports of consumer goods and other products 
which are not produced locally. The remaining exports are weak to keep economy, thus a 
challenge on how to acquire foreign exchange and at the same time aid flow which would 
compensate decreased at 50% (IMF Staff report, July 2016). This results to be the main cause of 
inflation as all imports are paid in USD at high price (see 827.5 RWF on May 11, 2017) 
according to UN Comtrade Database,2017).  As introduced form the introduction part, the reason 
for Rwanda to adopt export promotion is to speed-up economy (Rodriguez Mwalenga 2012) 
exports benefits a country’s economy in many ways; through exports country earns foreign 
exchange, goods are sold in return for foreign exchange, resources are greatly utilized, 
employments are created, primary products value added and so many, thus a country like 
Rwanda need to promote export to enjoy above benefits. 
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Furthermore, Rwanda as a country in East African countries and neighboring a big country need 
to export promotion so as to access regional markets like East African Community in which it 
belongs and the neighboring country of Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC) and  
lastly, lack of employment opportunities as mentioned in the debut, export promotion creates 
employment. Thus the more expansion, the more employment is created 
1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To answer questions raised, this thesis will utilize comparative analysis on the existing studies 
related to the topic and seek to draw applicable recommendations for similar development in 
Rwanda. In essence, the academic reports, literatures and the government documents will be 
evaluated to examine which strategies are best to foster export promotion. Also strategy 
instruments and motivations which Korea used will be explored and contrasted to depict some 
practical implications for export promotion in Rwanda.  
The case study of South Korea was selected based on its characteristics that are comparable to 
Rwanda. The analysis of export promotion strategy in each respective country examples will be 
based on the assemblage of illustrations considered in the existing literatures. The implications 
strategy proposals will be rooted/ based on the comparison between the established strategy 
frameworks, instruments introduced in the previous analysis. 
1.10 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is limited to accomplishment strategies that made South Korea to have speedy 
economic growth mainly in export sector, although Korea is infamous of her accurate 
achievement, but is not a matter of copy-and-paste but need to analyze Korea’s quick growth at 
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least in two causes. The first cause will base on Comparing Korea’s political and economic 
situations of the two countries, that is Korea and Rwanda where they have similarities. 
Secondly, analyze some strategies which were productive in Korea’s economic development.  In 
brief, this thesis will be much carefulness and prudence while looking which strategies Rwanda 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, earlier studies and literatures are reexamined to set recent theoretical and 
empirical literature. This section is divided into four parts; the first part comprises the definitions 
of key terms. The second part discusses empirical literatures on export growth on economic 
development, the third part displays the model countries in implementing two strategies and their 
advantages to economic development of a country, and lastly analytical concept of 
developmental state in four Asian Countries, North America, South Korea, Africa and 
Conclusion. 
2.1 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
Export Substitution Industrialization (ELI), Export-led, growth is a trade and economic 
policy aiming to speed up the industrialization process of a country by exporting goods for which 
the nation has a comparative advantage (https:www.definitions.net/definition/export). 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) is Development strategy focusing on promoting 
domestic production of previously imported goods to foster industrialization 
(https://www.britannica.com/topic/import). 
Export promotion measures means incentive programs that attracts firms into 
exporting(https://www.britannica.com/topic/import) 
Developmental state or hard state, is a term used by international political economy scholars to 




2.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Notwithstanding that, its well-recognized that export growth is significant to the economic 
growth, there has been evidence based on it to see if really it is salient. Starting from half way 
1980s Granger causality experiments was carried out to find out the relation between export 
growth and economic growth, the results manifested that, export led growth does not hold any 
effects until certain level of economic development, at the same time. This has resulted to the 
mixture of empirical works. Another scholar in the name of Hans Singer expressed the view that 
the positive effects of export oriented become not clear from the halfway 1970s even in the 
newly industrializing countries (Singer, Hans W., 1989).  Awokuse displays that there is some 
practical proof that backs the export-led hypothesis (Awokuse, Titus Vol.40, No.2, 2008), other 
scholars Lyer, Rambadi and Tang (2009) apply a co-integrated vector autoregressive model 
counter parted by a Granger causality test and display that the exports as manifested to be not 
important in explaining economic growth. Hence, the empirical evidence appears to be mixed. 
Amin Gutierrez de pineres and Avella-jorda (2007) use data for sixteen Latin American 
countries and come to the conclusion that the results for export-led growth hypothesis contrast 
with depending on the selection of data and test methodologies. Other group of works has tried 
out the hypothesis that changes the export product composition cause economic growth. The 
practical proof has shown back of the hypothesis in general. Ghatak.et.al. used co-integration and 
causality tests to examine the export led growth hypothesis for Malaysia and found that the 
economic growth of Malaysia was directed by manufacturing exports rather than exports of 
primary goods (Ghatak, S., Milner, c and Utkulu., Vol.29, No.2,1997). According to this author, 
the production of manufacturing like textiles has already started but requires the government of 
Rwanda to look for more investors partners in this sector as it has been proved to speed-up 
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economic growth.   Koh and Mah use co-integration test and error correction models to Korea. 
Their outcomes show that growth ratio of non-textiles, that is heavy and chemical industries, 
exports to textile exports has led to higher economic growth and vice versa. Trade liberalization 
is shown to have a positive effect on economic growth of Korea (Kon, sae Ran Jai S. mah, 2011). 
Different from the works examining the relation between export growth and economic growth, 
some scholars have examined whether export promotion measures truly results to export 
expansion significantly Jung and Lee, (1986) explored the impacts of various types of export 
promotion policies on the amount of manufactured exports in Korea. They found an aggregate 
export supply function where relative prices, subsidy and capacity utilization ratio as the 
domestic demand pressure variables. Subsidies like preferential export finance, tariff reduction 
and exchange rate changes using data for the period 1964-1980, they display that I percent 
increase in subsidy would bring about 2 percent growth in export supply. Despite the fact that, it 
is the first empirical work on the effect of export promotion policy on export, the measure of 
export subsidy includes neither export insurance nor duty drawback scheme was effective in 
promoting export supply of Korea during 1975-2001.  Also this strategy of providing incentives 
has proved to be contributing the promotion of exports though the percentage is not high, but a 
starting country in the field of export can provide regarding the selected sectors to promote like 
manufacturing since it has proved too. Lederman et al (2010) used data covering 103 developing 
and developed countries, their cross section analysis displays that export promotion agencies 
have statistically significant outcome on export expansion; For now, they do not consider export 
incentives such as export insurance and duty draw back (Jai S. Mah, October 2010).  This 
analysis backs the provision of export promotion, though, there are others which are no longer in 
use, but support that if countries give export incentives, there will be increase in export and 
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economic growth as well. Rwanda has just started manufacturing which is at starting period, thus 
need to provide these export promotions so as to attract more investors to invest in 
Manufacturing sector to increase productivity and be more competitive in the region. 
2.3  IMPORT SUBSTITUTION STRATEGY  
The strategy of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) results into replacement of goods that 
were previously imported with domestic of international openness. The strategy was founded in 
most of Latin American countries as a response to the break of World War I and ii and the 
economic depression of 1930s (Ayob Kahsai Michael, 2003:22). 
  Later, in 1955, ISI was followed as an intentionally industrialization strategy. It was provoked 
mainly by the ideas of Singer and Prebisch in the 1950s. One of the challenges developing 
countries face, is to ameliorate their economic growth due to the lack of success to recognize 
ways to amalgamate their economies with the world economy (ibid). The puzzle is to choose 
among the two strategies among Import Substitution Strategy and Export Substitution Strategy. 
Especially developing countries chose ISI, giving reason of having no ability to compete 
internationally and therefore choose ISI so as to make policies that protect their domestic market. 
The advantage of ISI, is that it creates a fence of import from their countries so as to back their 








Table 2.1 Countries implemented two strategies and results 
COUNTRY PERIOD TRADE SRATEGY GROWTH RATE 
Brazil 1955-0 Import Substitution 6.9 
Brazil 1960-5 Import Substitution 4.2 
Brazil 1965-0 Export Substitution 7.6 
Brazil 1970-6 Export Substitution 10.6 
Colombia 1955-0 Import Substitution 4.6 
Colombia 1960-5 Import Substitution 1.9 
Colombia 1970-6 Export Substitution 6.5 
South Korea 1953-0 Import Substitution 5.2 
South Korea 1960-5 Export Substitution 6.5 
South Korea 1970-6 Export Substitution 10.3 
Tunisia 1960-0 Import Substitution 4.6 
Tunisia 1970-6 Export Substitution 9.4 
Source: Ayob Kahsai Michael, 2003:22 
The Table 2.1 shows, the difference in economic growth in the countries that implemented two 
different strategies of industrialization. The table compares four countries for a period of 23 
years, Brazil changed from Import Substitution to Export-led and gained an increase in economic 
growth, in 1970s, gained 10.6 compared to 4.2 of 1960s. Colombia in 1970s gained an increase 
in economic growth compared to the first period of Import Substitution, the most exciting change 




Having insights of different countries increase in their economic growth, after implementing two 
strategies, the experience shows the best strategy to apply as Export-led strategy than Import 
Substitution. But again, all countries transition to Export –oriented after having carried out 
Import substitution, it means that Import Substitution is a prerequisite for Export-oriented 
promotion. When countries transition to export-oriented, there are some improvements in 
industrialization, industrial labor development and modern infrastructures which all are 
necessary for export-oriented. Thus on Rwanda’s case to implement DMRS to reduce Rwanda’s 
trade deficit which is a big challenge to economy and increase local production for consumption 
need to carry out both strategies but to a big extent export-led. 
2.4 FOUNDATIONAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF EXPORT STRATEGY 
Export strategy   industrialization was formally component of the national economies ‘growth of 
some countries like Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea by the time of post-world war ii. 
It moved to fame in latter 1970s when it succeeded the import substitution strategy which had 
influenced development policy intelligent in the Latin America region in 30 years later after 
world war ii.  The main intention of this strategy is to increase trade instead of reducing trade 
(Thomas I. parry, July, 2011:3).  Further, even though, some countries that adopted export 
strategy industrialization do charge high tariffs on certain goods especially agricultural products, 
their interventions are more outward than those of import substitution strategy (Ayob Kahsai 
Michael, 2003:22). Export strategy is the major task term to comfort national success as well as 
looking ways to alleviate poverty and bridge the gap that exists between developed and 
developing countries. Thus, necessary to expand general comprehension on latent explanation 
for reasons why developing countries including Rwanda should adopt Export Strategy 
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Industrialization. In regard to the above, ISI was perceived to have been neglected long ago, after 
it failed to deduct external reliance, in all times of importing raw materials. It should however, be 
noted that industries in developing countries had permitted technology from developed countries. 
Government intervention most especially via state owned enterprise (SOES), proved to be a 
culvert for flow of resources. 
2.5 ADVANTAGES OF EXPORT STRATEGY 
 The need to acquire international exchange is necessary as why there is coercion from 
international institutions, like World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) which have 
approved export industrial policies since 1960s and the leading countries in the process were 
Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea which are the base of developing countries to start to adopt 
their policies to manufacture for the global market instead of their small domestic market (Choen 
Krainara, 2007:9). Greenaway and Nam (Kyklos,1988) and World Development Report, 1987 
both suggest that the best performer among the two strategies is export-oriented industrialization 
which can lead to the successful growth of the country. Other scholars like, Arruria, Miguel and 
Seiji Naya displayed how the strategy is advantageous to economy’s development. The strategy 
consists better policies like motivations instead of controls, all the measures are applied 
Worldwide. Contrary to ISI policies which are bias to exports and generate market distortion. In 
export- oriented, it is easy to prove the effectiveness of export promotion strategy because its 
outcomes can be detected smoothly and their faults are rectified as soon as possible. Export-
oriented provide firms the chance to expand their markets and gain greater scale of economies. 
Export-oriented pushes firms to join contest in foreign market and obtain competences. 
According to (Car Baugh, 2007) export-oriented strategy motivates and persuades firms in which 
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developing countries are probably to have a relative advantage like labor intensive fabricated 
goods. Further, Balassa, 1978 stresses that, as developing countries are rich in human resource 
endowment, export-oriented strategy devotes to create jobs. The strategy is significant to 
developing countries including Rwanda which if established and promoted can kill two birds 
with one stone, meaning the strategy can; 
a. Promote foreign exchange 
b. Satisfy home market and foreign market 
c. Job creation opportunities. 
Lastly, Kissinger 1967, states that in export-oriented strategy, international rivalry compels 
domestic entrepreneurs to concentrate on possibilities and boost learning procedures. 
2.6 ANALYTICAL CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
The Developmental state theory is when the government has taken a crucial part of exhilarating 
trust to different investors by assisting them via socializing in subsidies investment scheme. So 
as to understand the developmental state, Johnson (1999) defined by pinpointing its first prime 
concern as economic development, that the developmental situation of the state dominates 
Ha-Joon Chang defines Developmental state as a state which produce and control informally and 
antagonistically attached to economic and political connection that can back constant 
industrialization. Chang (1999) continue to explain institutional adoption as when the state 
contains to changing outside market situation to endure competitive and further investment in 
human resource and development. Crucial components of the developmental state include state 
financial control via credit-based financial incentive structures and industrial policy drafted by 
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self-governing meritocratic elite embedded in association of common business conversion.  The 
state organizes and negotiates investment resolutions accompanied by a big economic 
association in a crucial sector. It is significant to record that devotion concerted objectives on the 
promise of private equity as well as encouragement of nationalist sentiment. 
2.7 DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN EAST ASIA (FOUR ASIA TIGERS) 
 In East Asia, particularly in South Korea, government supplied firm and foreseeable motivation 
schemes to industries that performed successful and could take these incentives away in case 
firms performance wasn’t sufficient. The selection criteria for targeted industries for assistance 
were in the domain of export performance and in the domestic competition. Though East Asia 
were good in formulating industrial policies. it should be admitted that, yet they had similarities 
and dissimilarities between the knowledge and actions of four Asian tigers. Like in South Korea 
and Taiwan, government interference was predominant and less insignificance in Singapore and 
Hong Kong. Besides, South Korea and Taiwan devoted to a great degree in development of 
domestic innovation abilities, contrary from Singapore and Hong Kong whose key technology 
strategy was to entice foreign investors (Lall 2000).  
2.8 SOUTH KOREA’S SUCCESS IN EXPORT STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF DEVELOPMENTAL 
STATE 
According to Chibber 1999, Park declared that the exports was the main pedestal of the country’s 
economic planning. On top of that, industries would in the end be awarded if fulfilled well and 
disciplined if they did worse than agreed on or they fail to do as well as expected. Such degree of 
economic accomplishment which president Park devoted to industries was noticeable. This 
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working situation prepared Korea business owners to produce exports for global markets which 
Koreans had a bit of comprehension and readiness (Benjamin Pham: political Science 211). 
Amsden (1989) use Johnson’s idea of the developmental state and use it to explain South 
Korea’s development background. The following are the most salient reasons for Korea’s 
success; 
South Korea government’s goal was to have rapid industrialization. Second, the government 
generated solid political environment which was conducive to Korean businesses to be bravery. 
Korea’s government interventions were intended to “get prices wrong” in order to persuade 
investment in another action plan which were salient firms (Benjamin Pham: political Science 
211). Last but not the least, Firms which accomplished the given tasks were financed, and the 
conditions were created in exchange for these allowances. Industries that worked well were 
given bonus, while those that didn’t reach to required standards were not given support and 
would sometimes be punished or fail forever in some cases. Allowances given to industries in 
many times were in terms of finance which Korea government had absolute control. 
2.9 DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 
In Latin America, developmental state was un productive compared to four Asian tigers.  The 
reason was that, industrialization strategy and other industrial policy asserted were not like those 
in East Asia. The difference of the two regions is that, all firms in Latin America were given 
same motivations as supplied to firms in East Asia but those of Latin America were inept. For 
example, the way rules and rivalry policies changed the structure of domestic market.  crucial 
features of a victorious developmental state. The policies were same in almost developing 
countries but their outcomes were still different in the two regions. For the side of four Asian 
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tigers, the policies brought conducive environment and used the advantage to exploit economies 
of scale and make firms to grow efficiently, while in Latin America, they only created a 
preserved home market for local firms but even un productive. 
Also in Latin America, they espoused an anti-export strategy of import industrialization and 
lacked government capacity and investment in different sectors like in education, science and 
technology innovation was less qualified than in East Asia. 
2.10 DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN AFRICA 
 Making an effort for industrialization in Africa was in general inadequate. Even though, there 
are some successful countries like Mauritius, Botswana and Madagascar. But in general inward 
industrialization in Africa failed. According to UNCTAD (2007) the first reason for failure given 
is that developmental state wasn’t successful due to incapacity of the African states to formulate 
and implement an effectual industrial policy. 
The second reason given, is incapacity of ISI to modify external conditions differently and the 
third reason which is the last is political dimension where Robinson (2009) explains that 
industrial policy succeeds when leaders with power really want industrialization to flourish. In 
relation to the Robinson’s idea, Rwanda since 2000 has established a government program 
development with six objectives, but among all the key is to transform a country from 
agricultural based to middle income country, from all above experiences, Rwanda has an 
advantage of knowing which strategy to apply, according to Winston Churchill “Those that fail 
to learn from history, are doomed to repeat it”. Thus the history of other countries should be 
insight for Rwanda to know which strategy to apply. In short, after insight of past and current 
experiences of some countries like Brazil, Colombia, East Asian countries, Latin America and 
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African countries, one can ask which strategy should Rwanda adopt?  Having seen countries that 
succeeded and others that failed, this will provide Rwanda with awareness to decide how to go 
through so as to afford to design and execute its export promotion effectively. 
Also Rwanda will acknowledge that for a country to formulate industrial policy, need to have 
dynamic nature of controlling excellent policy, where its content and objectives are extendedly 
assessed and upgraded taking into consideration the outcomes acquired, under the restrictions 
provided by the convenient wealth and capacities. Also according to recent literature Rwanda 
should know, that there is no single formula for effective export industrialization. Preferably, the 
prominent general agreement is that the successful export industrialization policy requires to be 
combination of many practices and country’s domestic exercises are all important characteristics. 
 Though economic literature of industrial policy is huge, something important has been learnt 
from its theory and empirics, for a country like Rwanda need to consider its political economy of 
industrial policy, the history of the country that need to formulate industrial policy, what 
characterizes the economics of the country and the last the political environment of the country, 
all components mentioned above determine what kind of industrial policy is practical and 










CHAPTER 3: KOREA IMPORT SUBSTITUTION POLICY 
3. INTRODUCTION 
From 1950s, the Korean government policy was Import protectionist and export to certain extent 
so as to acquire some foreign exchange.  Essentially, it was government’s development policy 
whose intention from the beginning was to enlarge industrial from import Substitution, the 
government espoused to it as an answer to the serious foreign exchange crisis by then. Import 
Substitution under protection was the stand and policy for industrialization recommended by the 
economics profession in the 1950s and 1960s, it was only after the East Asian experiences that 
benefits of open trade regime began to be recognized by the profession (Kruger (1997). The 
policy aim for industrial development through Import Substitution was obvious in the tariff 
increase of the tariff system that established in 1950, they arranged from zero to more than 100% 
on goods like essential, food grain, raw materials and other non-competent goods. Luxury goods 
contained tariff cost of 100% or above. For a long time, tariff exemptions were established in 
1952, capital goods imported and individual tariff rates were amended, but the whole structure 
tariff wasn’t changed up to 1970s. Import restriction has upsetting effect on export through 
another pathway like effect on foreign exchange rate. Import restriction decreases the import 
demands and consequently the demand for foreign exchanges, thereby decreasing the exchange 




3.1  KICKOFF OF EXPORT PROMOTION STRATEGY 
Korea government adopted export-oriented strategy which had favorable outcome contrasted to 
the earlier ISI procedures. It is said that US coercion to reduce aid was the salient factor that 
directed South Korea to adopt export strategy. In the beginning Korea depended on US foreign 
aid, the time reached when America gestured to Korea that it wasn’t reluctant to persist 
providing aid to South Korea, from this gesture South Korea found alternative source of to obtain 
foreign currency reserves was to adopt export strategy. Besides, US advisors had earlier along 
persuaded Korean leaders to enlarge its export size in part since America’s growing military 
confrontation in Vietnam in which Korea can export to (Siwook Lee, Spring 2003). 
3.2    EXPANSION AND EFFECTS OF EXPORT STRATEGY 
 The annual growth grew to 35.3% on average, from 1963 to 1969 later in 1970, the growth 
decreased to 25.4%. Studies show that Korea’s economic growth started by the time of Import 
Substitution then to Export Substitution promotion in 1960s and the trade policy shifted in the 
direction of less interference and more relaxation method (Core & Lyman, 1971). Differently to 
other studies that followed in 1980s which   support   the government to have contributed a big 
role. According to Table 3.1, it comes into view as the year 1959, to be the commencement year 
of total export. In that year, the amount of export grew to double-digit rates which is the proof. 
Although, during that time growth look to have happened by possibility totaling to 25.5% growth 





Table 3.1 Korea’s export expansion from 1957-1970 
(MILLION CURRENT DOLLARS) 
Year Total 
exports 
Manufacturers Non-manufacturers Export/gnp (%) 
1957 22.2(-9.7) 4.1(66.6) 18.1(-18.2) 0.6 
1958 16.5(-25.9) 2.6(-37.3) 13.9(-23.3) 0.6 
1959 19.8(20.4) 2.4(-7.1) 17.4(25.5) 0.7 
1960 32.8(65.7) 4.5(89.2) 28.3(62.5) 1.4 
1961 40.9(24.5) 6.2(37.8) 34.6(22.4) 1.8 
1962 54.8(34.1) 10.6(69.6) 44.2(27.5) 2.0 
1963 86.8(58.4) 39.5(273.7) 47.3(6.6) 2.9 
1964 119.1(37.2) 58.3(47.7) 60.7(28.9) 3.9 
1965 175.1(47.1) 106.8(83.1) 68.3(12.5) 5.8 
1966 250.3(43.0) 153.6(49.9) 96.7(41.6) 6.6 
1967 320.2(27.9) 215.2(40.0) 105.1(8.7) 7.1 
1968 455.4(42.2) 338.2(57.2) 117.2(11.6) 8.1 
1969 622.5(36.7) 479.1(41.7) 143.4(22.3) 8.8 
1970 335.2(34.2) 646.3(34.9) 188.9(31.8) 10.2 
 
Note: The number in the brackets are annual growth rates in current dollars. 
Source: KOSIS, On-line information service, National statistics office, the Korean government, 
Jungho Yoo, (2017) 
The Table 3.2 displays how the share of SITC6+8 in total exports increased expeditiously from 
1962 growing from 10% to 70% until 1968. It is believed that, this rapidly increase in export was 
great role played by labor-intensive manufactures. Thus, the year 1962 is recognized of the year 
of rapid export expansion.  Also another distinct feature that entitled to have played a great role 
in the export expansion is the new items that appeared in the same category of subgroup 






Table 3.2 Export of new items, 1960 to 1970 (Thousand Current Dollars) 
New items                                                                                   All others 






1960 - - - - - 32.827(65.7) 
1961 36 - - 36(-) 0.8 40.878(24.5) 
1962 1.358 40 - 1.398(3783.3) 17.2 53.415(30.8) 
1963 5.384 578 23 5.985(328.1) 17.3 80.815(51.3) 
1964 7.499 1.431 749 9.679(61.7) 17.4 109.378(35.3) 
1965 24.914 3.104 4.572 32.590(236.7) 32.3 142.491(30.3) 
1966 39.269 4.851 14.175 58.295(78.9) 40.7 191.242(34.2) 
1967 68.556 10.300 26.687 105.543(81.0) 53.1 214.684(12.3) 
1968 124.103 17.583 39.611 181.297(71.8) 58.4 274.100(27.7) 
1969 172.474 13.676 63.543 249.693(37.7) 60.0 372.820(36.0) 
1970 233.313 11.642 104.250 349.205(39.9) 60.9 485.977(30.4) 
 
Note: 1. “New items” are footwear, travel goods, and clothing, which began to appear in 1961; 
synthetic fabrics, umbrella, and artificial flowers in 1962; woolen fabrics and wigs in 1963. “All 
others” denote total export less export of new items. 
2. The numbers in parentheses are percentage growth rates in current prices. 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economics statistics yearbook, 1960,1964, 1966, Ministry of 
commerce, trade statistics yearbook, 1964 
The table 3.2 shows that; the expansion of new items was blistering than the growth of the 
actual export items. Within five years of exports, when new items become visible in exports in 
the year 1961, they grew 1091 times current dollar terms, those of 1963 grew 1722 times. The 
plausible example is clothing(SITC84) item export which increased from 2 thousand dollars in 
1961 to 213.6 million dollars in 1970. In comparison with the former items for exports, their 
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total export was less compared to new items. The growth rate of new items didn’t last for long, 
thus the growth decreased and became like the former items. Although, it is believed that new 
items led to the sudden and rapid export expansion (Jungho Yoo, 2017:5). 
3.3 EXPORT INCENTIVES IN  1950S-1960S 
The first system was trade credit system which was in place in 1950, in this system, exporters 
benefited the prime concern of being allocated in domestic credits. This policy approval persisted 
from 1960s to 1970s, the interest rates on loans to exporters were badly decreased from 1960s. 
Another export means in the name of preferential export system or export-import link system 
was espoused in 1951, in which exporters of nonessential domestic goods benefited the 
appropriate way to use some parts of foreign exchange earnings for importing popular items 
which couldn’t have been imported. This system was stopped in 1953 by the time of devaluation. 
Since 1952 to 1954 exporters benefited preferential access to foreign exchange loans in a scheme 
that was set for the government-held foreign exchanges (KFX) to domestic users.  In 1955 direct 
subsidies were provided for exporters later on, the subsidies came to an end due to government 
failure to include them in government budget which was established in 1959 on imports of raw 
materials and intermediate goods for exporting. Tariff exemption which later was changed to 
tariff rebate in 1974 (Jungho Yoo, 2017). A subsidy in the name of Importer’s licenses were 
allowed only to the industries whose export execution fulfilled at least an approved model or 
standards. The lowest export required for a permit in 1964 was at $ 100.000, in 1969 it increased 




                                    Table 3.3 Major export incentives 
        Description        Dates Applicable 
Tariff exemption on imports of raw materials and spare parts 1959-72 
Domestic indirect and direct tax exemptions 1961-72 
Accelerated depreciation 1966-72 
Tariff and tax exemptions granted to domestic suppliers of 
exporting firms 
1965-72 
Wastage allowances subsidies 1965-72 
Import entitlement linked to exports 1951-55,  1963-65 and 1966-71 
Reduced rates on public utilities 1967-71 
Registration as an importer conditional on export 
performance a 
1957-72 
Dollar-denominated deposits held in Bank of Korea by 
private traders b 
1950-61 
Korean Trade promotion corporation 1964-72 
Monopoly rights granted in new export markets c 1967-71 
Direct Subsidies 1955-56 and 1961-64 
Export targets by Industry 1961-64 
Credit subsidies 1962-72 
Export credits d 1950-72 
Foreign exchange loans 1950-54  and 1971-72 
Production loans 1959-72 
Bank of Korea discount of export bills 1950-72 
Import credits 1964-72 
Capital loans by medium industry bank  1964-72 
Offshore procurement loans 1964-72 
Credits for overseas marketing activities 1965-72 
       
         Source: Charles Frank, Jr., Kwang Suk Kim and Larry E. West phal, 1975 
In addition to this, in the year 1969, traders were classified in four categories and given names 
like blue, white, yellow and red-cards holder, which accounted for annual achievement jazzed-up, 
the best performance businesses were favored in different ways including exemption of collateral 
for regular and special tariffs, relaxation of tax surveillance and preferential treatment in foreign 
exchange allocations for overseas (Charles Frank, Jr., Kwang Suk Kim and Larry E. West phal, 
1975:67). Individual exporters were likely given monopoly rights in new market export. This 
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type of subsidy started in 1962 but only was used to few goods till 1967. In 1972 was a reform of 
many export incentives which was lessened. The lessening was as follows; 50% reduction in tax 
of corporation and individual business income earned from export was terminated. Government 
declared a gradual adoption of a tariff rebate. Lastly, till 1973, imports of raw materials for 
exports were allowed tariff exemption, but when importer failed to rise the designed export 
target and rules was fined.                                                                                                                                          
In Table 3.4, it is shown that, from 1967 to 1970, export incentives persisted on going. Among 
all the subsidies, preferential loans were the powerful and salient engine for export promotion 
during the interest rate reform of 1965. The table displays the increase of diverse subsidized 
government finance loan schemes for exports in the year 1967 to 1970. Also in the year 1968 and 
1969 export industry operating credit and export industry promotion were terminated. 
Government replaced them with credits for domestic production of raw materials for export 
productions and processing. 
Table 3.3 Government subsidized finance loan schemes for exports in 1967-1970 
Outstanding credit million won as of Dec 31 
  1967 1868 1989 1970 Annual interest rate Term  
1. Export credit 6.618 8.072 11.866 19.129 6.0 90-135 days  
2. 
Loans for suppliers of 
US off-shore  
procurement 
3.399 3.567 5.291 4.510 6.0 90 days  
3. Credit for imports of raw materials for export 17.835 20.239 31.868 49.981 1.5 60 days  
4. Payment guarantee (11.8350) (8.859) (14.201) (21.244)    
5. (Domestic issuance foreign exchange (62) (29) - - 6.0 
90-135 
days  
6. (Import loans) (6.481) (11.351) (17.666) 28.737 6.0 90.135 days  
7. Export issuance 652 550 1.986 4.463 6.0 90-120 days  
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8. Loans for export - - 35 154 6.0 90-120 days  
9. 
Foreign exchange loans 
for import of capital 
goods for export 
industries 
1.849 7.802 10.297 21.372 12 3-5 years 
80% of 
import value 
through 68 & 
90% in 69 





operating loans (count 
part fund) 
193 - - - 18.0 1 year Abolished after 1968 
12. 
Equipment loans for 
conversion into export 
industry 
1.531 2.237 2.536 2.826 12.0 5 years 
A maximum 








13. Loans for export specializing industries 292 563 742 807 12.0 
90-120 
days 5 years 
14. Loans for production of raw materials - - 134 833 6.0 
90-120 
days 




Loans for preparing 
agricultural and fishery 
products for export 




 Total 32.430 43.398 68.196 180.083    
 
Source: Bank of Korea: Medium industry Bank Raised to 90 percent per annum, June 
1971 
Another subsidy in the name of flexible wastage allowance increased in support another 
incentive for export in 1960s to support many industries (Charles Frank, Jr., Kwang Suk Kim 
and Larry E. West phal, 1975:63-65). However, Korea government have invested a lot of export 
measures to promote exports, the findings manifested that, these measures did not directly 
influence exporter’s earnings, and their effects that was observed on export was unintended 
[Hong (1979:49), Frank, Kim &West Phal (1975:38,60). 
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Table 3.4 Growth and changes in industrial structure 1953~1977 
 
As the table 3.4 displays, the increase in growth rate was escorted by the quick change in 
manufacture make up. The example in agriculture, industry and fishery which composed of 42 % 
of GNP in 1957 amounted to 23% in the 1972, manufacturing which had 9% grew to 25% of 



























1953 5.6 89.6 2.6 - 2.3 - 
1955 6.2 81.8 2.7 .5 7.3 1.3 
1957 15.2 65.9 .0 .0 18.2 .3 
1960 30.9 48.8 3.5 1.2 12.3 .3 
1963 20.8 30.5 3.5 1.0 39.8 4.7 
1965 16.6 21.2 3.0 +2 57.6 3.1 
1968 11.7 13.5 1.1 .7 68.2 5.4 
1970 9.6 12.0 2.0 1.4 68.7 7.4 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic statistics yearbook, various years 
Note: Figures do not add to 100 owing both to rounding and to a small “unclassified” category in 
Korean imports 
Table 3.6 Major four digits commodities exported 
SITC Code Commodity Value (millions of U.S. 
Dollars) 
 8414 Clothes and accessories, knitted or crocheted 132.9 
 8411 Clothing of textile fabrics 129.2 
 6312 Plywood 126.8 
 8999 Miscellaneous manufacturing neck. 70.6 
 7293 Valves and tubes 48.5 
 2613 Raw silk 39.3 
 8510 Footwear 37.4 
 8412 Clothing and accessories made of fabric 36.2 
 6521 Cotton fabrics 20.7 
 0311 Fish, fresh and chilled 20.0 
 6516 Yarn and thread of synthetic fibers 19.2 
 6743 Iron and steel plates and sheets 19.2 
 6556 Twine, cord, and rope 17.2 
 6535 Fabrics made of synthetic fibers 14.4 
 0313 Crustaceans and mollusks 14.1 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
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Table 3.7 identifies 15 biggest four-digit export categories. Such products include textile, apparel 
items which was dominant but entails also iron sheet products, ply wood, footwear and fishery 
products and many others in table 3.7 
3.4 GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO SMES 
Korea government initiated countless tangible incentives to encourage small entrepreneurs to 
become exporters. When the government targeted a certain product as far as the market oriented, 
it generated direct and indirect incentives whether in financing, taxation and managerial 
command to the producer who met the requirements. The incentives included reductions in 
corporate and private income taxes, tariff exemptions for tax rebates. Government provision of 
accelerated allowances to manufacturing industries enabled them more than 50% of revenue in 
foreign exchange and gained more 30% of ordinary depreciation which was authorized by the tax 
law. All incentives government provided, interest subsidies to exporters was the most significant. 
3.5 KOREA’S IMPORT POLICY 
Although Korea government was necessarily export oriented, it had not quit or introverted to the 
free trade. Likely, in 1967 in Korea, domestic industries were safeguarded by direct import 
controls. Imports were allowed on the starting point of those items that were included on the list 
of items allowed to be imported. The list included main items like essential raw materials, energy, 
capital and intermediate goods. After the government adopted consolidated exchange rate system 
in 1964, it continued to construct incentive formation that preferred utilization of imported 
capital and intermediate products to expand active export firms. The government proceeded with 
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import measure’s restrictions especially on general quota, foreign exchange allocation and 
imports legislations to dishearten consumer’s importing (Ibid). 
Table 3.7 Comparison of bank interest rates in export vs commercial loans 
 
Source: The Bank of Korea: Economic Statistics Yearbook 
All through the initial two decades of Korea’s engagement in the export promotion, the export 
interest rates were remarkably below than that of commercial rate, computing to 40 to 60% of 
the commercial. Table 3.98 shows that, in 1965 when commercial interest rate increased to 26%, 
that of export adventures financed as much as 6.5% short term credits to exporters which 
continued to increase up to 7% of required capital by 1973. Export credits had always been 
forbidden to form credit controls (Kwan S. Kim, November 1991). Standard units for moral 
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incentives were espoused with almost same coercion. Ministry of Commerce and industry set 
annual export targets for firms in export section. If targets were not achieved, the responsible 
people in the ministry looked for the causes and get solutions as soon as possible so as not to let 
export promotion fail. Export producers were allowed subsidized loans from established 
institutions to promote exports, such as Korea Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank, 
Technology Development Corporation and National Investment fund. In these institutions, a 
number of legislation and regulations like tax incentives law, the government budget and 
accounting law and the tariff laws provided diverse forms of tax relief and tariff reductions for 
imported inputs to the manufacturer. 
3.6 3.6. KOTRA AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
Institutions related with export promotions were established like (KOTRA) Korea Trade 
Promotion Corporation, these institutions were formed in 1962 with tasks of making research 
and trade promotions. Their tasks include; display Korean products, participate in international 
trade affairs, dispatches trade missions to potential markets and receives inquiries and visits from 
foreign businessmen seeking Korean products, the institutions also sponsored the Korean 
exhibition center which hosts major trade fairs like foreign buyers. While another private sector 
called Korean Traders Association which runs the World Trade center in Seoul, gave feedback to 
whichever information related to trade to its over 2300 member companies. Another trading 
companies named Chonghap Sangsa was important agency which was formed by the 
government to train exporters how to increase export promotion(ibid). Big companies were 
attracted to infiltrate the business field of diverse incentives like advantages in the areas of trade 
administration, export financing, taxation and foreign exchange control. The government cracked 
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export targets into detailed parts by domestic exporters inspiring them to produce in the direction 
of the adequate acceptable performance. The selected exports found on what the industries 
reflected to attain were increased every year by the government regarding its own prediction on 
how fast export should mushroom. So the Chonghasangsa establishment was another instrument 
to make export oriented work better for the country. Because of Chonghasangsa, there was 
completely development of industries that came to be recognized than in the beginning, network 
reached all over the world, all agencies established, worked conjointly to assist industries to get 
niche in overseas markets. Hence, President Park’s official policy for bringing industrial base 
into existence for export promotion showed beyond doubt fruitful impacts of development(Ibid). 
3.7 MUSAN SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 
3.7.1 Introduction 
Like other developing countries, Korea in its developing time adopted Special Economic Zone 
Strategy (SEZs) in 1966-1970. In latest years, SEZs has enticed great number of countries that 
moved from inward strategy to outward strategy using SEZs as a master plan for extending and 
improving country’s economies. As SEZs entice countries, the more number of zones have been 
growing in different countries (ILO, October 2009), among which Korea is included, apart from 
that, the number of employment in SEZs grew as well as its variety (Guan Gwen meng, 2005). 
3.7.2 Musan objectives 
In its first phase of commencement, Korea established its five-year development strategy in 
which it adopted two objectives; 
 To promote export-oriented and 
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  import oriented in consumer goods. 
Table 3.8 Musan size and firm’s composition activities 




Composition of SEZs 
SEZs 1970 95.4 -Manufacturing type, multi product high-tech, 
high value added manufacturing 
-Logistics-type, trading logistics 
 
Source: Aradhna Aggarwal 17.73, Copenhagen Business School 
 As Korea’s technological know-how was weak by then, the country encouraged firms to 
concentrate on foreign technologies so as to overcome the challenge of reducing total 
amount of imports and foreign exchange shortage it has. The solution to this challenge, 
Korea government found the best way to handle it, was to inspire FDI in export oriented 
sector so as to gain new technology and advance Korean manufacturing (Lee sang Cheol, 
Seoul: KIEP, 2008) 










US $ Million 
Foreign Investment 
US $ Million 
Employment 
83 52 3.256 1.921.2 213.5 135 7.318 
 
Source: Jeong Hyunggon, operation system and policies for success of Navoi FIEZ 
By the time of its establishment, the zone attracted 70 enterprises with $ 218 million in 





3.7.3 Link of SEZs performance with domestic economy 
In the beginning of SEZs establishment, 80% of the total amount of imports were used by SEZs 
firms from foreign markets, only the portion of domestic market procurements was 20%. 
However, as time passed, the percentage of domestic market procurement increased at 40% of 
total imports by 1990s (Dorsahi madani, working paper, no.2238)  
3.7.4 Contributions of SEZs 
The portion of Musan SEZs in Korea national exports has never been considerable in the starting 
period. The export share of Musan SEZs was 1.21% in recent years of 1990 since its 
establishment, on the other hand, SEZs covered up some deficit in the balance of trade, it also 
did some role in 1980 of reducing total trade surplus at the percentage of 69 (Aradhna Aggarwal 
17.73, Copenhagen Business School). Apart from covering some deficit, SEZs played some 
crucial roles in Korean economic development as follows; 
 SEZs provided employment and foreign exchange generation in earlier stages of 
economic growth,  
 Built technological capabilities in the manufacturing sector during the take-off stages. 
While in the latest stage of growth, Korea’s SEZs was used as a key tool in upgrading 
technological aspects of the economy.  
In conclusion, Masan SEZs is recognized as the most fortunate SEZs in Korea and the first zone 
to be established with the highest scores. In its debut stage of the first five years, FDI in its area 
of location grew from 1.23$ US Million exceeding almost 88 $ US Million. Later, in the 
following years investment declined in Masan export zone due to different reasons like oil crisis, 
global recession and labor revolts. 
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3.7.5 Korea’s successful export promotion 
 Korea’s successful in export expansion has many factors that contributed to this export growth 
to which among them was Government intervention. The government role was credited to have 
contributed a significant role in export promotion whereby this extraordinary economic growth 
began in 1961 when Korea government transitioned from Import policy to Export Substitution. 
Since from transition, Korea has shown remarkable performance in export.  To further this 
expansion, the government put in place countless of direct export incentives some include long 
term low interest, government subsidized loans and price controls (Irma Adelman, 2014).  
Furthermore, to promote export promotion, Korean government categorized export firms in 
relation to market oriented dimensions and the president of Korea forced individual firms to 
implement as they were told. To support these firms that were forced to produce certain goods, 
they were allowed a safeguarded domestic market. The government printed a forbidden imports 
and quotas out so as to allow exporters satisfy domestic market without competition. 
Another salient factor for export promotion was commitment of Korea’s president Park. In 1965-
1979 after attaining the achievement of export which was set, president Park established export 
monthly meeting to promote export. This meeting was chaired by president Park and attended by 
top policymakers and industrialists, all problems and obstacles related to export promotion was 
identified and solved in the meeting. In addition, export day was a chance of meeting private 
sectors themselves without delegation, in this monthly meeting, ministry of trade announced the 
annual export target in the beginning of the year, and at the end of the year, successful exporters 
were highly acknowledged and given award and other government incentives. This culture of 
rewarding best performers motivated exporters and this made exporters to work hard to meet 
targets set. As a result, monthly export promotion meeting was often considered as a collective 
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learning process, building capacity of all participants of the meeting, including policy makers 
and businessmen. To strengthen investment, capital goods imports were given preferential 
treatment and to increase utilization cost rate of existing requirements. Also intermediate goods 
imports were given preferential care. Failure to defend intermediate capital goods in 1950s to 
1960s which contributed a prominent role to the fast export promotion in the end 1960s and 
1970s as producers of exports were free to utilize low-cost imported intermediate and capital 
goods in place of high-cost domestic products.  
In conclusion, South Korea is recognized of the best achiever in export promotion in 1960s and 
1970s yet it was not the only country that adopted export strategy alone to develop countries 
economic development, but has managed to be the successful one, while other countries that 
adopted the same strategy failed, one can ask which strategies Korea used to reach its 
achievements? It is said that one of the core strategy for Korea’s success was state’s intervention. 
The Korea government undertook crucial responsibility in undertaking the assignment of 
resource distribution so as to generate distinct national forms like production, investment and 
export. All policies which ruled capital distribution which would influence industrial make up 
were handled carefully by the government. Further, Korea’s strategies were ever changing, 
tactical and fast in adjusting strategy preferences. Korea set two principle objectives to attain its 
set goals. 
Firstly, the government found the best way to reach its goals is to support the already exporters 
that were in industries with comparative advantages. Secondly, to advocate SMEs that were in 
export area, so that if government assist them can quickly adjust to industrial sector. Thus, 
Korea’s export led strategy was formulated based on export strategy type with incentives to 
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CHAPTER 4: RWANDA EXPORTS 
4. INTRODUCTION TO RWANDA EXPORTS   
The development of Rwanda exports outset from early 1930s  following  the Belgian colonial 
administration until 1962 when Rwanda got independence, the main export was coffee  with 
55%,  followed  by various minerals like cassiterite, tin and wolfram  consisting  of 37%, 3% 
pyrethrum and 2% tea  up to 1994, the main export commodity of Rwanda was coffee which 
become extensively in the country from 1930s when Belgian colonial administration forced 
Rwandans to grow coffee to increase revenue collection to Belgian colonies of Rwanda –Urundi 
during the time of great depression. From independence time to 2009, Rwanda exports can be 
classified into three interval periods. 
The first interval starts from 1962-1986.  In this period, the export average was 8% GDP, coffee 
commodity with 60%, minerals had 30% and other export products like tea and pyrethrum. 
The second interval start from 1986-1995. During this time, export sector inclined down ward. 
The cause for decline was the global coffee down-turn that happened in 1986, this made a 
decrease of 70% export in this period. This was followed by consecutive devaluation and 
political instability of 1990 Rwanda genocide (Dimitri stoelinga, Nov 2012). 
The third interval period start from 1995-2011. In this period, Rwanda was rebuilding itself from 
1994 genocide. The export commodities had collapsed between 4-5% of GDP, services overtook 
the export and had 55% of exports in 2000(Ibid). 
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4.1   EXPORT COMPOSITION 
Rwanda exports are composed of traditional goods which include tea, coffee and minerals. In 
Rwanda national development program vision 2020, the government ‘s goal is to achieve GDP 
per capita of US $ 900 in 2020, the export growth is targeted at 15% per year and is considered 
as a key tool to play a role of reducing imbalance-of-payment difficulties and trade deficit (NES, 
March 2011). But with EDPRS II (2013-2018) the annual growth rate was accelerated to 28% 
per year (EDPRS II). The three main exports account for 88% of the country’s exports, while the 
rest has 12% which include non-processed agricultural products, live animals, pyrethrum, 
construction materials and many others (NES,2011). 
 
Figure 4.1 Rwanda exporting commodities in 2010 




Figure 4.2 New firms in manufacturing   with new exports 
Source: Dimitri Stoelinga Nov 2012, Understanding Rwanda’s export sector 
In 2005, Rwanda gained new exporting firms as well as new exporting commodities from 
manufacturing sector. According to the table above, the portion of firms and their exports has 
increased mainly in tea, after it was privatized in 2006, also coffee processors increased after it 
was privatized and also in mineral mining sector due to investors that have invested in this sector.  
4.2 RATIONALE OF RWANDA TO PROMOTE EXPORTS 
In the last past years, Rwanda’s economy has been increasing at average rate of 8% per year 
(World Bank, 2015 a). The growth has been guided by important expansion of export worth, 
which has increased by 20% every year since 2014 (MINICOM, 2015). In the past years, the 
increasing growth was facilitated by the increase and stable mineral prices in the global market. 
However, in 2015, when the prices of the minerals declined, other export commodities are weak 
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to compensate, as a result there was decrease of 7% in 2017(Trade and export promotion, IGC 
Jan 2017). While on the side of imports, it has continued to increase three times that of exports in 
2016. This has resulted to increase of trade imbalance, foreign exchange reserve decrease 
according (MINICOM,2015). As a result, Rwanda government has though out of promoting 
exports as quick as possible so as to reduce trade deficit that is rapidly increasing, increase 
foreign exchange and to ensure macro-economic stability to mention but a few.  Furthermore, 
export expansion will create jobs as Rwanda has targeted to create 200.000 jobs per year 
according (MINECOFIN, 2013). To achieve this target, Rwanda need to formulate suitable 
strategies to attract investors in export sector who will promote export as well as creating jobs 
(Trade and export promotion, IGC Jan 2017). 
4.3  INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
In 2011, industrial policy was established with a vision “to have competitive industrial and 
advanced service sectors producing over $ 1.5 billion of exports by vision 2020, while increasing 
the number of off jobs” (industrial policy 2011). This section is subdivided into two parts. 
The first part discusses Background of industrial sector in Rwanda. 
 
Figure 4.3 Composition of industrial sector in Rwanda 1999-2015 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Rwanda 
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The figure 4.3 shows the components of industrial sector in Rwanda, Construction carries high 
percentage followed by agro-processing and others as the table narrates.   
To develop export promotion, industrial sector in which manufacturing is included, need 
different strategies and policies put forward by Rwanda government to develop and promote 
industrial sector among which, some has been done are as follows; 
4.4 ESTABLISHMENT OF RWANDA DEVELOPMENT BOARD (RDB) 
The government established Rwanda Development Board (RDB) in 2008, so as to bring together 
other government institutions that deal with investment under one agency. The government gave 
the agency the following tasks;  
 The agency was to serve as a one stop shop for all investors. 
 The agency was responsible for new business registration, promote investment, 
environmental authorization and privatization. 
 The agency has the task of transforming the country into a global hub for business, 
investment and innovation 
 Lastly to provide the current and potential exporters trade and market information as well 
as advise and recommend to the government on practical measures to stimulate export 
trade (Rwanda Development Board 2015). 
4.5 ESTABLISHMENT OF KIGALI SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES (KSEZS)  
The plan to establish Special Economic zones (SEZs) in Rwanda came in 2006 and put in real 
implementation in 2008.  The SEZs has two stages. The first stage comprises of sixty-one (61) 
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plots which were in operation in 2014, all plots in this zone are already reserved with current 
companies migrated from the old industrial park area called Gikondo. The second stage has also 
finished to be prepared in which the government announced more than 80% of the plot were 
reserved. Large number of investments are in lineup with strategic DMRS targets.  The SEZs 
was established to answer domestic private sector constraints like industrial and commercial land, 
Cost of energy, transport linkages, market access and reduced bureaucracy and availability of 
skills.  
Diverse attempts have been undertaken to bring more investors to Kigali Special Economic zone 
which is a mixed use of the following investments; 
 
Figure 4.4 Showing KSEZ firm categories from 2013-2016 
Source: victor steenbergen Beata javorcik, August 2017 
According to figure 4.4, there are four comprehensive categories of KSEZ firms. The bigger one 
comprise of manufacturing firms, followed by warehouses, then other firms and support services. 
The key motive for initiating special economic zone is to attain foreign exchange and domestic 
private sector investment into the nation in order to approach new business capital, ameliorate 
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industry’s productivity, export growth, arouse job creation and diversification development of 
industry. 
Secondary, SEZ act as part of broad economic reform strategy that targets to grow and expand 
new export industries especially manufacturing prior to enlarging them to the rest of the 
economy. For better functioning, the SEZ is maintained with roads, electricity, water, a fire 
fighting system, a sewage system and fiber-optic cables (F-38419- RWA-1, August 2017). 
Because of commitment of Rwanda’s leadership, quality of its work force and the conditions 
offered in SEZ, C&H Garments decided to set up in Rwanda in 2014, C&H is the factory that 
manufactures many varieties including police uniforms, handmade pieces and many others. Most 
of the manufactures are intended for export use (Ibid). 
 
Figure 4.5 Impacts of Kigali Special Economic Zone on exporting and importing 




According to the figure 4.5, the portion of firms in Kigali special economic zone,  that export are 
relatively small, and their number has been low as time passed. The example, is in the year 2013 
in which 33% of all firms in KSEZ exported small quarter of goods, again in the year 2015, the 
export amount decreased to 20% which later in the end 2016, the export amount increased to 25% 
of all firms in KSEZ that exported. It was observed that, between the year 2014 and 2016, the 
firms that were established in KSEZ came into sight to be focused on the domestic market than 
the primary reason of KSEZ establishment. The firms in KSEZ carry on more imports to use in 
production for domestic market. 
 
Figure 4.6 Firms in KSEZ that exports and imports (Annex A. 4) 
Source: victor steenbergen Beata javorcik, August 2017 
The figure 4.6 shows that, in the year 2013 the main exported goods were foodstuffs totalling to 
75% in KSEZ, followed by 24% from furniture. In the year 2015, the more firms were 
established in KSEZ, in which the overall goods for export expanded to eight categories, and in 
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the year 2016 the categories for exports increased to 10 exporting KSEZ firms. Although, the 
total of exports has not extended exceedingly extra , it  percived through different categories of 
exports that increased, hence KSEZ contributing significant role of export diverseness. 
 
Figure 4.7 KSEZ firms exports and imports 
Source: Victor steenbergen Beata javorcik, August 2017 
The  figure 4.7 shows the total of exports and imports. Thus KSEZ advocate to be doing a great 
job of reducing Rwanda’s trade imbalance. Even though exporters are few in number, but their 
exports exceed imports. Hence KSEZ proving to be the salient source of government export 
though not all firms in KSEZ  export. 
In conclusion, Kigali economic special zone (KSEZ) is still immature as it was established in 
2013, Rwanda government has put much effort to develop it. In short  since KSEZ 
establishment,it has played a salient economic contribution like employing permanent employees 
and increasing domestic sales. Also KSEZ has contributed 4.5% of all national exports and firms 
in KSEZ are increasingly manufacturing variety of different export commodities 
comprehensively. KSEZ has played prominent roles in reducing Rwanda’s trade balance in all 
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quarters except in the year 2016, though imports is apt to exceed exports (Victor steenbergen 
Beata javorcik, August 2017). 
 
Figure 4.8 Types of KSEZ commodities exported 
Source: victor steenbergen Beata javorcik, August 2017 
4.6 INCEPTION OF DOMESTIC MARKET RECAPTURING STRATEGY 
In the year 2015, DMRS was formulated to supplement other strategies like National industry 
strategy, National export strategy and Special economic zone policy (SEZ) all aiming to reduce 
Rwanda’s trade deficit, increase local production for the domestic market while adding to basic 
conversion of fruitful part and increasing global competitiveness. In accordance with DMRS 
goals are to boost domestic production for local consumption, provide fundamental change of 
productive sector and increase global competitiveness (MINICOM 2015). DMRS priority sectors 
are categorized as follows; 
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 Construction materials 
 Light manufacturing and agro processing. 
The sectors consist of twenty-one (21) particular sectors with selection based on capacity 
deduction to import reduction,  the state of organized activities in  the sector, the  dimension of 
the home market and export capacity to neighboring countries, opportunities of raw materials 
and whether activities have strong connectivity’s to the domestic capacity of the domestic sectors 
like cement, textiles and garments were spotlighted as compelling for the DMRS, with big 
possibilities for recapturing the domestic market ( Pritish Behuria, Feb 2017). 
4.7 MADE IN RWANDA CAMPAIGN 
To aid the DMRS, Rwanda government initiated made in Rwanda campaign, whose intention is 
to transform the mindset of local people to buy local and have confidence in the admirable local 
products. Partly, Rwanda government pledged to back local firms through its procurement 
contracts, at the same time holding affairs and finance in advertising for community produced 
products. The government founded an Export Growth Facility (EGF), with estimation of higher 
than one billion Rwandan Francs. The EGF permits exporters to obtain finance at 8% dividends 
per annually up to 50% of the value exports acquired when searching new markets overseas 
(Pritish Behuria, Feb 2017). 
4.8 ESTABLISHMENT OF EXPORT GROWTH FUND 
Rwanda government to increase external connectivity and growth of exports as crucial priority of 
EDPRS 1& II as well as to boost economic growth and alleviate people from poverty, has 
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launched Export Growth Fund (EGF). The fund is to support under three main components, 
which are; 
 An investment catalyst fund:  Is a subsidy provided with interest rate of loans to private 
investors who decided to invest in export oriented. 
 A matching grant fund for market entry: Are grants given to certain firm that invested in 
export activities. 
 An export guarantee facility: Are transactions related to commercial banks 
4.9 EGF OBJECTIVES 
To facilitate SMEs with interest rate return of 50.000 Rwandan francs to 1 Million to access 
bank for export production expansion 
Rwanda government facilitate SMEs with technical assistance to improve their capability on 
export promotion 
To widen financial services to Rwanda’s has improved formal finance sector. 
4.10 EGF TARGETED SECTORS 
To motivate private sector investments in exports via subsidized loans with 10% as interest rate. 





Also a lot of strategies and policies have been established like SME Development policy (2010) 
who’s among many objectives, the prominent one is to champion job creation and grow in size 
tax and export base via the encouragement of aggressive new and current SMEs mostly in value 
added industries. (SME Development policy 2010:14). Not only that, other policies like Trade 
policy (2010), competition and consumer’s policy (2010), private sector Development strategy 
(PSDS) (2013-18), different supports and capacity buildings like Netherlands Development 
Agency (SNV), UNIDO and USAID are in place to give support to industrial sectors. 
Further still, Empowering institutions responsible for capacity building like WDA, has been 
established, reform policies have been implemented to avail land for industries and agriculture, 
good governance and zero tolerance to corruption. 
Also, Rwanda joined EAC and Common wealth bodies to ensure partnerships and wider markets 
(Pritish Behuria, February 2017). 
In short, Rwanda exports are composed of traditional goods, however in recent years there have 
been increase in minerals which also increased the price of exports. This increase in minerals 
didn’t last for long, and due to the composition of Rwanda exports, when mineral price 
decreased, the remaining exports are weak to compensate for the gap created, thus a very big 
challenge for the economy due to increase in trade deficit (Mincom, 2015). To expand export 






CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH KOREA AND    
RWANDA IMPORT- EXPORT EXPANSION STRATEGY 
5. COMPARISON OF KOREA AND RWANDA  
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 show the detailed analysis of import- export Strategy 
Table 5.1 A comparative analysis of import- export  strategy of Korea and Rwanda 
Strategy applied South Korea Rwanda 
The institution contributed to 
export expansion 
State intervention State intervention 
Adoption of the strategy import and export strategy Import and Export strategy 
Government strategy 5 Year government program Vision 2020 and EDPRS I 
&ii 
Strategies and policies to 
eradicate poverty 
Semaul-Undong Girinka and ubudehe and 
many others 
Export start-up  period 1950s on wards 1930s on wards 
Major exports 
commencements 
New items were 
manufactured like clothing, 
foot wear, umbrella, artificial 
flowers 
Export commodities were 
coffee, tea and minerals  
Objectives  Self-sufficient Transform Rwanda into 
middle income by the year 
2020 
Export incentives Korea invested  huge export –
import incentives  and bank 
subsidized loan incentives 
Removal of Non Trade 
Barriers and created Export 
growth fund to support 
exporters and investors 
Government institutions 





















Institutions established to 
provide Subsidized loans to 
exporters  




-National Investment Bank 
-Export Growth fund put in 
Rwanda Development Bank 
Selective of priority 
industries and targeting 
sectors 
Korea  used this system of 
selecting and targeting since 
its export promotion 
Rwanda has adopted this 
system recently in 2015 in the 
name of Domestic Market 
Recapturing Strategy 
(DMRS) 
Role of private sector Korea’s private sector has 
contributed a lot to Korea’s 
development through 
exporting and importing 
Rwanda’s private sector is 
still weak  
 
The two Countries, Korea and Rwanda espoused export strategy to develop their economic 
development and applied different strategies. Korea implemented its policies through five-year 
economic plan to promote exports while on Rwanda side, they are included in vision 2020 and 
medium term of its implementation EDPRS I and ii. Also Korea established institutions that 
provided subsidized loans, to both exporting and importing firms to increase their production and 
targets while Rwanda has launched export facility fund to finance SMEs, investors that are in 
exporting sectors only. Last but not least Korea government through ministry of commerce and 
industry set targets for firms’ production which kept on increasing from year to year which 
helped Korea’s exporting firms to be successful this has resulted into big private sectors like 






Table 5.2 Comparative analysis of SEZs Evolution of Korea (1970) and Rwanda (2013) 
Feature Korea Rwanda 
Establishment of SEZs policy Export-oriented small extent 
import 
SEZs is to promote both export 
and import strategies 
SEZs Authority Under Government Under Government Authority 
called SEZAR 
SEZs objectives -Promote export 
-import oriented and 
-promote investment 
-Promote export growth 





Location of SEZ first zone -Advanced region near airport -Advanced region near airport 
Year of establishment of 
SEZs 
1966-1970 2008-2014 
Size of zone coverage 95.4 (ha) 98(ha) 
SEZs firm composition -manufacturing 
-multi product high tech 
-value added manufacturing 





Number of foreign firms 85.4% 66% 







-Reduced trade deficit 
-Contributed to export growth 
Trade facilitation Provided incentives (list of 
number of incentives) 
Provided incentives 
No of employment Number of employment 
increased from 21.000-36,000 
Number of employment 
increased from 2.000-4.000 still 
in the process 
Performance linkage with 
domestic economy 
30% of imports came from 
foreign market,20% domestic 
market later domestic 
increased to 40% 
-In 2013, 75% firms imported 
from foreign market, the number  
varies 
SEZs objectives has not been 
considered in the debut 
-Contributed to trade surplus, 
share of exports 1.21% 
-Reduced trade deficit than 
increasing exports, share of 





In brief, the SEZs policy adopted by Korea and Rwanda was to promote export and import 
oriented substitution within the plan of export oriented as their set objectives. Since the initial 
stage of the policy, on the side of Korea the SEZs did not consider the objective of export-import 
oriented instead contributed in trade surplus side, while on the side of Rwanda, the SEZs has 
contributed in reducing trade deficit. However, in both countries the firms established in the zone 
are dependent of foreign market imports. On the side of governance, SEZs in Korea is under 
government institution led while as on Rwanda side, the government has established an 
Authority under the law No 05/2011 of 21/03/2011; which regulates the establishment, 
development, operation and maintenance of special economic zones in Rwanda (SEZAR). Last 
but not the least, the establishment year of SEZs in both countries are different, in Korea the 
SEZs was launched in 1966 and put under implementation in 1970, while in Rwanda the launch 
was in 2008 and implemented in 2014, although SEZs has not contributed so far as export 
expansion is concerned, but has played a big role in creating employment, increased investment, 
reducing trade deficit and increasing industry’s productivities. 
In conclusion, this chapter’s center of attraction is to make a comparative analysis on export 
promotion in Korea and Rwanda. It summarizes both country’s adoption of import-export 
strategies, examines the strategies that each country has adopted. The chapter begin by analyzing 
similar strategies adopted by both countries like import-export strategy, government intervention 
in both countries’  economic development, both countries had government strategic year plan, 
For Korea, it is five-year plan, Rwanda is EDPRS 1 & II medium term,  which includes  
Government programs to alleviate poverty from people, establishment of institutions to promote 
exports and to provide loans and subsidies, selective of priority sectors to accelerate exports, then 
establishment of SEZs in both countries  to  promote   economic developments of two countries.  
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Almost in both countries the strategies look similar because all countries’ aims are to promote 
their economy’s development, for the side of Korea to promote exports much concentration has 
been focused in manufacturing sector from the beginning, in which the government has invested 
much incentives to both exporting and importing firms, apart from this, the government 
established various banks to give loans to the firms  engaged in these sectors, each firm  was 
allocated in  certain sector and given targets to reach, from these working mood and targeting led 
to the growing of some firms into big companies as Sum Sung, Hyundai and many others.  While 
on Rwanda side, the concentration was put on developing traditional commodities from the 
starting stage of exporting,  later  the government privatized coffee and tea to private companies, 
Mining sector given to investors, exporters are assisted in solving some challenges they 
encounter like removing NTBs, trade barriers on boarder countries and some transport tariffs, for 
the subsidy loans, Rwanda government established EGF a fund  provided  to support exporters 
and investors, this certain  fund   is allocated in  Development Bank of Rwanda,  also Rwanda 
government has started targeting some sectors to promote exports  using  Domestic Market 
Recapturing Strategy (DMRS) whose goal is to boost domestic for  local production and increase 
of global competitiveness. The difference is that Korea was in much focused in promoting 
exports but with less attention in import, while as in Rwanda the focus is in import-export 
promotion to increase domestic local production for domestic market as well as for exporting and 
reducing trade deficit through establishment of DMRS and Made in Rwanda campaign. 
In summary, Korea established five-year economic plan with objective of self-sufficient 
industrial structure. Much emphasis was put in areas like electrification, fertilizers, oil refining, 
synthetic fibers and cement while in Rwanda the general development strategy is explained in 
the government program called vision 2020 and EDPRS. Both documents provide overall 
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development objectives of the country. Vision 2020 supplies the general development objectives 
where the short term, is to promote macroeconomic stability and wealth creation to reduce aid 
dependency, in the medium term, is to transform the country from agrarian to knowledge-based 
economy, and lastly in the long term, is the creation of a productive middle class promoting 
















CHAPTER 6:  PROPOSED SOLUTION BASED ON KOREAN 
EXPERIENCE 
6. INTRODUCTION 
Notwithstanding that, this thesis main intention is to examine the lessons Rwanda can learn from 
South Korea’s experience, the international trade environment of 1960s and 1970s and the 
present situation conditions are different. For example, the forces of globalization of both trade 
and capital flows are now powerful than during those years of Korea, also today’s trade is 
concentrated on intra-regional trade which is more important and foreign firms have created 
production networks within the world and in the region. The rules and regulations that guide 
world Trade Organization are now more strengthened than those of GATT, which Korea was 
working through. In addition, many concepts and plans that has connection to economic policies 
are successful in exciting economic development and are presently different from those of 1960s 
and 1970s (Hany H. Makloof, vol.3, No.3, 2016). In spite of that, there are some lessons Rwanda 
can learn from successful export promotion which has made Korea to be among the tenth world 
exporters in the world but will also discuss some of the policies Koreans used which are not 
applicable today. The lesson from Korea’s experience will follow under the following factors. 
6.1 STATE INTERVENTION 
Under government intervention, starting from Korea’s president, it is believed that Korea’s 
successful in export promotion the great role was played by president Park.  In 1964 to 1979, the 
government set a target of collecting 100$ million from exports, after achieving it in 1979, they  
come together  to celebrate and from then president  Park established a monthly export meeting 
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chaired by him which was attended by other high officials and leaders of private sectors, the 
agenda of the monthly meeting was to discuss issues related with exports, the participants had 
opportunity especially the exporters to speak out any challenges they encounter to the president 
so as to be solved and make exports continue increasing. The meeting was another tool of 
communication between business people and the president. Also seeing president giving value to 
exports, people came to know how export was significant to the country’s economy. In every 
beginning of the year, ministry of industry and commerce set targets for the firms and in the 
monthly meeting, the best performers in export were given reward and prize on the export day. 
Rwanda government need to walk in footsteps of Korean government to promote export and 
make economy grow more. In Rwanda, targets are set to some government institutions like in a 
government agency responsible for collecting taxes called Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA), 
districts in performance contracts of the year (imihigo). After the end of the year, in Rwanda 
Revenue Authority (RRA) the best performers or best tax payers are recognized and rewarded, 
same like the districts, the end of the year the districts performance contracts are evaluated and 
the best performers are rewarded. For this reason, the culture should be on every government 
institution and exporting and importing firms should work on targets mainly those in export 
sector so as to motivate firms involved to produce more, while on the side of the districts, after 
end of the year, they are evaluated depending on their targets from the beginning, and they are 
ranked from the first one up to thirty as districts are thirty in the country, and the first three 
performers are recognized and rewarded.  On issue of having a monthly meeting with the head of 
state normally in Rwanda the meeting with exporters carrying out their business especially in 
EAC is chaired by the ministry of East African Community (EAC) quarterly, if in a year the 
meeting is chaired by the president, it would be an added value and helpful in addressing 
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challenges firms and industries in Rwanda in this sector are facing. Also target working spirit is 
another lesson that helped Korea to succeed in export promotion, if this culture of working on 
target is imitated in Rwanda and practiced in all sectors can be useful when firms know that they 
will be evaluated at the end of the year. 
6.2 IMPORT AND EXPORT TRANSITION 
 Import substitution was the foundation to transition to export oriented. In export oriented, new 
items that increased export products included clothing, footwear and others which kept economy 
growing. For Korea’s transition to export, government didn’t quit from import substitution, 
instead continued to carry out import substitution, while complementing outward oriented. Korea 
continued protectionist to selective items that were produced by domestic industries. But allowed 
imports like essential law material, energy, capital and intermediate goods. Hence the experience 
for Korea is that though much effort was invested in export promotion but also protecting 
domestic industries was done so as not to be dominated by these imports. But imports which 
these domestic industries needed as law materials were allowed such as capital goods and 
intermediate goods (Kwan S. Kim, November 1991). Despite that, Rwanda is carrying out both 
Import and Export Substitution, much focus should be put on export- oriented according to what 
observed from literature review and lessons from Korea’s experience on which adoption of 
outward export promotion has been proved to be productive and making economy grow, 
however, Import Substitution should be maintained so as to protect domestic firms. 
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6.3 EXPORT INCENTIVES 
Furthermore, Rwanda also can draw a lesson from Korea’s experience in extending credits to 
exporters at a reasonable interest rates and in motivating savings which would be used for capital 
formation. Korea established institutions like Korea Development Bank, the exporter’s bank, the 
technology Development corporations and National Investment Fund which had legislation and 
rules related to tax incentives and many other forms of taxes. The lesson from Korea was  that, 
the government established other many institutions to work hand in hand with exporters in 
searching market and in training how to improve and promote exportation, on side of Rwanda, 
the government has created Export Growth Fund (EGF) which is a facility with aim of 
facilitating export oriented to access finance by offering interest subsidies on investment loans, 
grants for market penetration and credit insurance guarantee to boost export volumes and access 
new markets. This EGF money was put in Rwanda Development Bank, which has signed 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with private banks to lend money to exporters and small 
medium enterprises which I see as not the way to enhance export promotion and doing business, 
the private banks will wait for exporters to come for money, but had the money been put in 
government banks, these banks would go for mobilizing people to come for money and improve 
their exportation size and volumes.  Also in private banks, exporters may face challenges to 




6.4 HUMAN RESOURCE AND EDUCATION 
Korea’s success in export promotion experience is again observed in its human experience. This 
has been a significant factor for Korea’s development which started from their quality education. 
Korean government invested much in education which the parents have been supportive to the 
policy. Education together with human resource made Korea’s industries competent in 
managerial skills as well as in high quality labor force which contributed to the Korea’s growth 
of export led industrialization (Ibid). Rwanda has got the challenge of qualified personnel as in 
past years, private sectors has announced this issue, however Rwanda government has put much 
effort to make this challenge solved by setting up a work force development authority (WDA) in 
the year 2008 so as to nurture expertise in development. According to C& H Garments a new 
investor in garments who has recently established her factory, has shown that Rwandan workers 
are disciplined and trainable (Manson 2015b), though government tasked its institution WDA to 
continue preparing training manual, but a lot need to be done from schools both in vocational 
and non-vocational schools so as to have a competent labor force as Korea. 
6.5 SELECTIVE PRODUCTS 
 Another lesson from Korea’s experience is making selected products while giving subsidies and 
loans to exporters involved in their production which helped Korea to enter in capital intensive 
production while following market oriented. This way of working helped Korea to specialize in 
comparative advantage in industrial sector. The more Korea started mobilizing exporters to take 
a part in industries, the larger number that intervened, the more economy was liberalized with 
little government intervention. The lesson for Rwanda to learn is that, much effort should be put 
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in selected products in the beginning, provide all necessary aid to exporters like subsidies, loans 
and advises to show direction, the more progress in direction government will give, the more 
achievement, the more liberalization in trade, the less government intervention 
6.6 MARKET DIVERSIFICATION 
Another lesson from Korea’s experience is the President Park’s different market diversification. 
It said that during export promotion, Korea had signed many agreements with different countries 
for trade. This   helped Korea to sell the manufactured products in different countries because the 
more the state promoted exports, there should be where to market them, Korea diversified 23% 
of exports to China, 13% to EU, 10% to US and Japan 5%. By 2009, china had 85%exports of 
Korea which all helped Korea during recession. 
Rwanda has got good market opportunities mainly to regional neighbors where in 2015 Rwanda 
exported 32.2% to Democratic Republic of Congo(DRC) as the first country’s exportation harbor, 
apart from these, Rwanda has got other countries to export from like Kenya, Europe to mention 
but a few. In the second National Export Strategy and Economic Development and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy ii (EDPRS II) calls attention to the importance of DRC and Burundi to be the 
export destinations to Rwanda according (MINICOM, 2015b, MINECOFIN, 2013). Rwanda has 
got many exporting harbors and enjoys preferential access to developed markets, but need to 
improve its productivity since it has identified target products like specialty food, textiles, 
apparel and home décor and fashion (Linda, Phyllis Judith Tyson, June 2017). In addition, for 
Rwanda to promote export, the government need to look patterns especially from developed 
countries who can invest in the selected sectors for more productions. In Domestic Market 
Recapturing, the government selected three priority sectors which include; Construction 
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materials, Light manufacturing and Agro-processing, which have twenty-one specific sectors 
chosen based on how they are potential to reduce imports (Pritish Behuria, Feb 2017).  
Nevertheless, two countries have got similarities, ISI strategy has been perceived as unjustifiable 
model of speeding-up development. Likewise, since Rwanda is in need of a strategy that can 
faster economic development, it is better to carry export-led strategy as the one has been proved 
to be effective strategy. 
6.7 AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR EXPORT 
Also another lesson from Korean experience is that, in export substitution, policy needs should 
be closely monitored and modified if necessary. The strategy is a continuing process, not just a 
single event. It means periodic policy re-evaluation and revision are necessary (Siwook Lee, 
spring 2013). 
Rwanda government should strengthen an institution responsible to promote export so as to help 
Rwandan exporters to have access advantages which are not utilized due to lack of coordination 
and knowledge on export promotions. In National export strategy, it is said that Rwanda products 
has preferential access to many key markets, but due to above challenges mentioned, Rwanda is 
not maximizing its advantage. An example is AGOA trade preference, according to the study 
carried out by RDB, it manifests that Rwandan stakeholders need to improve their export skills 
to bound export accounts. For Korea case, the government established an institution called 
KOTRA which had task of participating in international trade fairs in return would train 
exporters what they need to improve and how to go through market. Also the agency, dispatched 
trade missions to potential markets and received inquiries and visited foreign market and 
businesses seeking market for Korean products. 
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Even though there are lessons to learn from Korea, but there some policies Korea used which are 
not applied to day. These include; 
Korea is said to have achieved its growth due to countless incentives and loans. However, these 
subsidies and loans are severely banned by World Trade Organization. Such taxes include tariffs 
and quotas for the protection of domestic markets of exporters which are presently banned. Also 
WTO rules put much effort to ban export subsidy levels. Export-quotas and domestic content 
rules for direct foreign investment are forbidden. Inspire of all subsidies banned, the 














CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7. SUMMARY 
This final chapter is subdivided into two components. The first part will make conclusion and the 
second part will give policy recommendations. Despite Rwanda and Korea have different levels 
of development, Rwanda and South Korea have similarities. Both countries have an advantage of 
strong and committed leadership, well-functioning institutions in fight against corruption and a 
high degree of government organization and security environment. The detailed conclusion and 
recommendations are as follow: 
7.1 CONCLUSION 
Korea’s successful in export promotion has got many debates about to which factor that 
contributed most, but it has been argued the paramount and strong one to be the state’s 
intervention sometimes called Developmental state as elaborated in this thesis literature.  Thus 
Rwanda to learn from the experience of South Korea it is possible since the two countries have 
some similarities like all to have been colonized in the past years, both countries passed through 
bloody post conflicts in which millions of people died but both countries have managed to  
reconstruct the country out of  the  past   tragedies,  both countries lack natural resources, both 
countries were  aid dependence,  both countries have one ethical language and lastly, people in 
these countries have showed devotion to back their leader’s for development achievement. 
Though, both countries have similarities to enable Rwanda learn lessons from Korea, the two 
countries have dissimilarities like, geographic location of Korea being near the sea and Rwanda 
being a Land locked country which is a vital challenge for export promotion,  thus for Rwanda to 
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succeed in export promotion following footsteps and strategies of Korea in 1960s and 1970s is 
possible though  may differ in intensities due to Rwanda’s economic challenge which is the 
biggest obstacle to carry out an international trade.   Apart from the above, Rwanda’s private 
sector is also weak compared to how powerful Korea’s private sector have contributed a lot to 
export expansion. Lastly, both leaders of the two states have devotion and commitment to 
develop their country’s economic development, despite of the highlighted obstacles above, 
Rwanda has recognized the solution to it, is to integrate with East African Community hence 
conclude saying it is possible for Rwanda to learn lessons of promoting export expansion like 
those of Korea in 196os and 1970s despite of some economic challenges mentioned above.  
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS   
a. In order for Rwanda to become successful in export promotion as Korea successful achieved, 
the government’s strategic plan should be elaborated well in which the purpose of the 
development and intention of the state is clearly stated. It is imminent to have the advice and 
command from the leader with a well stated intention but under the circumstance of which 
market is not active. The government strategy and market plan should be established in 
complementary way, that is complementing one another. All these to be done, need skillful 
economists and technical experts with expertise in economic systems.  
b.  South Korea succeeded in export promotion in which much push was put in manufactured 
exports which was produced by labor. These products were traded in Japan and US, where 
South Korea acted as middle supply and capital goods thus gaining the advantage of being 
the largest and main exporter in the market. Likewise, For Rwanda to promote export 
strategy, more effort and emphasis should be put in manufactured exports as center of 
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concentration since Rwanda has labor to produce such manufactured goods like clothing, 
footwear, processed food, sports goods and toys which can be sold in East African market 
and neighboring countries of DRC and Burundi. 
c.  Rwanda being a land locked country, regional integration is the salient factor to strengthen 
trade. The country being far from the port, makes transport of exports and imports expensive. 
The World Bank ranked Rwanda’s trading across boarders 87th out of 183 economies 
assessed (World Bank 2017), Rwanda’s land locked location and almost high transportation 
cost increase the expense and speed of cross border trade. Rwanda being a member of East 
African community will reduce transportation obstacles but more partnership in trade should 
extend to DRC as EDPRS II targets and vision 2020 has elaborated to the biggest market 
population. 
d. Mobilization of investors to invest in export sector is highly needed. Though Rwanda’s 
domestic market is small, EAC and DRC are other wide market which can attract more 
investors. 
e. Nonetheless, much effort has been put in place to overcome the challenge of skilled 
personnel, but the journey continues as the ones trained are not enough. Thus Rwanda 
government together with WDA need further training not just to fulfil private sector’s 
demand but also for skilled personnel with various aspects of skills in different sectors. 
f. Rwanda to become successful in export promotion, its correct that much effort should be put 
in export oriented but again other sectors shouldn’t be forgotten since all are important in 




g.  Rwanda to strengthen export promotion, industrial development policy should be integrated 
in Rwanda Development Board. Presently, the industrial development policy makers are 
under ministry of trade, while the ones that enforces these policies are in RDB, thus a 
challenge to know the situation the investors on field are facing. It would be better to 
formulate the policies, make a follow up of their implementation so that in case, there is a 
challenge modification could be done.  From the experience of Korea, policy makers were 
quick and flexible in policy implementation viewing positive and negative effects that might 
abrupt policy implantation and ready to formulate plans so as to achieve their set goals. In 
addition, constant evaluations of the performance and dynamics were done. 
h.  In addition, for Rwanda to promote export, the government need to look patterns especially 
from developed countries who can invest in the selected sectors for more productions. 
i. For Rwanda to promote exports need to formulate policies that will lead to export expansion. 
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